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Smith: Life Lesson: If You Place a Wager on April Fool's Day, You Cannot

LIFE LESSON: IF YOU PLACE A WAGER ON APRIL FOOL’S
DAY, YOU CANNOT BE SURPRISED WHEN THE
FINAL OUTCOME IS A JOKE
I. INTRODUCTION: “THERE’S

A

SUCKER BORN EVERY MINUTE . . .”1

The Illinois case Dew-Becker v. Wu2 is the latest example showing that court cases provide color commentary for the time’s prevailing social issues.3 In Dew-Becker, the timely social issue before
the court involved a type of online sports gaming, daily fantasy
sports (“DFS”).4 In addition to providing an issue-spotting sign1. See Michael Stewart, There Is a Sucker Born Ev’ry Minute, GENIUS, https://
genius.com/Cy-coleman-there-is-a-sucker-born-evry-minute-lyrics [https://
perma.cc/37HJ-UZFE] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (providing lyrics from 1980
musical about P.T. Barnum). See generally Drew Harwell, All the Reasons You
(Probably) Won’t Win Money Playing Daily Fantasy Sports, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/10/12/all-thereasons-you-probably-wont-win-money-playing-daily-fantasy-sports/ [https://
perma.cc/9EL5-JHUS] (providing overview of daily fantasy sports model). “The
top 1 percent of players, they found, paid 40 percent of the entry fees but reaped
91 percent of the profits. Meanwhile, the ‘minnows’ in the bottom 80 percent paid
an average of $49 in entry fees and lost half that cash.” Id.
2. Dew-Becker v. Wu, 2020 IL 124472 (Ill. 2020) [hereinafter Dew-Becker I].
3. See The Evolution of the Daily Fantasy Sports Industry, ROTOGRINDERS, https://
rotogrinders.com/static/daily-fantasy-sports-timeline [https://perma.cc/Q2A3RQMH] (last visited Feb. 9, 2021) [hereinafter Evolution] (chronicling “first gaming sites being founded in 2007” on timeline pertaining to daily fantasy sports
play); see also Tribune News Services, Daily Fantasy Sports Sites Support Illinois Regulation Plan, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:48 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
sports/breaking/ct-illinois-daily-fantasy-sports-spt-20160225-story.html [https://
perma.cc/23H4-ZEEU] (showing DFS expanding rapidly in Illinois, noting interest by public interest groups, operators to see regulation developed). See generally
Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL, at *¶¶ 4–6 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (detailing basic structure of daily fantasy sports contests, which are events allowing individuals to make
online wagers regarding success of teams they create using players from multiple
professional teams, used to compete against other wage-makers using statistical
data).
4. See Dew-Becker v. Wu, 123 N.E.3d 86, 87-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) [hereinafter
Dew-Becker II] (describing April 1 wager generating claim as “bet placed between
plaintiff and defendant through the fantasy sports website FanDuel”); see also DewBecker v. Wu, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) [hereinafter
Dew-Becker III] (noting at time of original complaint Illinois courts had not yet
ruled whether DFS constituted gambling); Karis Hustad, Wait, Can I Still Play Daily
Fantasy Sports In Illinois?, CHICAGOINNO (Dec. 30, 2015, 2:53 PM), https://
www.bizjournals.com/chicago/inno/stories/news/2015/12/30/wait-can-i-stillplay-daily-fantasy-sports-in.html [https://perma.cc/R7EZ-SMZW] (showing two
major DFS operators filed lawsuit in 2015 to force court to make ruling about
legality of DFS play in Illinois). See generally Phillips v. Double Down Interactive
LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 733 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (showing trend of online gaming by reporting one company’s participation rate of players originating from Illi-
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post, the Dew-Becker case also highlights a challenge faced by states
eager to capitalize on new revenue created by citizens’ newly discovered recreational activities: dealing with inconvenient, outdated
statutes initially established to protect citizens from harm.5
Reliant on real-life sports data for its contests, DFS gaming is
an outgrowth of the sports construct called fantasy sports.6 This
activity took hold with the advent of widespread Internet use and
the resulting ease of access to sports statistics.7 In fantasy sports,
individuals draft fantasy teams informed by statistical data from live
professional and amateur sports competitions.8 The gamers’ fortunes rise and fall over a traditional-length sports season in lockstep with real-time events impacting performance, such as injuries.9
Participants learn the results of their teams’ performances—and
their winnings—at the end of the season.10 Before the 1990s, enthusiasts had to invest significant time to gather data and then ananois internet addresses approaching twenty thousand). In Phillips, the plaintiff
tried to bring a class action lawsuit under the Loss Recovery Act against an online
casino-styled game that did not provide cash winnings. See id. at 733–74 (describing Double Down Interactive LLC online casino games, amended complaint).
5. See Kimberly Saginario, Note, Regulation Is Crucial for Daily Fantasy Sports:
Why Illinois’s Proposed Bill Is One the States Should Follow, 69 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 843,
848–49 (2017) (citing Numbers at a Glance, FANT. SPORTS TRADE ASS’N, http://
fsta.org/research/industry-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/4FE5-8U62] (last
visited Dec. 2, 2016)) (reporting in 2016, 57.4 million fantasy-sports-playing individuals across United States, Canada spent average of $556 annually); see also Matthew J. Dowd, Comment, A New Leader in the World of Legalized Gambling: What the
Illinois General Assembly Should Do to Protect Pathological Gamblers from the Rapidly Expanding Industry, 31 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 439, 448 (2011) (highlighting diluting effects
on statutes designed to protect citizens from fallout of illegal gambling activities
resulting from efforts to reap revenues from gambling).
6. See Dustin Gouker, New Official Data: Daily Fantasy Sports Generated $335 Million In Revenue in a Year, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 28, 2018), https://
www.legalsportsreport.com/21627/ny-dfs/ [https://perma.cc/9TNH-R7LV] (explaining DFS market almost at capacity, need for legal sports betting market to
achieve earnings expectations); see also Darren Heitner, An Abbreviated History of
FanDuel and DraftKings, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
darrenheitner/2015/09/20/an-abbreviated-history-of-fanduel-and-draftkings/
[https://perma.cc/ED8M-QQMN] (quoting press release for launch of FanDuel
in 2009 describing DFS as innovation of fantasy sports). See generally Ciciora, infra
note 99 (explaining relationship of DFS to sports gambling).
7. See Heitner, supra note 6 (discussing how internet lessened time required
to compile, evaluate statistics that form basis of fantasy sports competitions).
8. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America
Regulates Its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 10–14 (2012)
(reviewing how players develop their fantasy sports teams).
9. See Saginario, supra note 5, at 851–52 (describing typical fantasy sport-season length).
10. See id. at 852 (“[DFS] players know the outcome by the time they go to
sleep that night.”).
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lyze data by hand.11 However, new gamers wanted a quicker
timetable for results and rewards; thus, DFS gambling was born.12
The DFS model capitalizes on the market for wagers based on a
single sporting event instead of the entirety of a season.13
By 2010, DFS companies such as FanDuel offered online platforms to connect daily gamers and facilitate their wagers.14 By
2013, the market for DFS gambling was well-established.15 By 2014,
DFS play was generating more than $370 million in entry fees annually for FanDuel alone, and there were projections the industry
could reach $1 billion by 2020.16 Then, in 2020, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association decision declared that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(“PASPA”) was unconstitutional due to its resulting interference
with state sports gambling legislation.17 Previously, the lack of certainty surrounding the Act’s applicability to DFS contests had
served to temper DFS play in the United States.18
11. See Edelman, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining how previously DFS players
“needed pads of paper and calculators”).
12. See Heitner, supra note 6 (“[O]ne of the major problems with fantasy
sports is the huge time-commitment involved . . . . [I]n this era of Facebook and
Twitter, people want instant gratification.”).
13. See, e.g., Overview, DRAFTKINGS, https://www.draftkings.com/about/dailyfantasy-sports/ [https://perma.cc/XU52-ZT5F] (last visited June 11, 2021) (“Daily
Fantasy Sports (DFS) mirrors season-long fantasy sports but condenses it into a
shorter, more sweat-inducing format.”).
14. See Evolution, supra note 3 (showing original founding DFS companies, as
well as dates of acquisitions and mergers of major DFS operators).
15. See id. (showing growth of business investment since 2006, year DFS became legal possibility for states, as “Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
(UIGEA) was signed into law”). The RotoGrinders site provides a timeline of the
industry’s growth and shows that FanDuel entered the DFS market in 2009. See id.
(“[Fan Duel] would pivot to DFS offerings in July 2009.”).
16. See Chris Grove, FanDuel Breaks 1 Million Paid Actives in Q4, Claims 80%
Market Share, L E G A L S P O R T S R E P . (Jan. 13, 2015), https://
www.legalsportsreport.com/313/inside-fanduel-q4-revenue-user-numbers/
[https://perma.cc/5FKS-FVGU] (showing growth of FanDuel during 2014 with
links to additional growth calculations).
17. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485 (2018)
(citation omitted) (holding PASPA “ ‘regulate[s] state governments’ regulation’ of
their citizens. . . . The Constitution gives Congress no such power.”).
18. See id. at 1470 (footnote omitted) (“PASPA’s most important provision . . .
makes it ‘unlawful’ for a State or any of its subdivisions ‘to sponsor, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other
betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on’ competitive sporting
events.”); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44398, DAILY FANTASY SPORTS: INDUSTRY
TRENDS, LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES, AND POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2016) (explaining
PASPA relationship to DFS play since daily events were not exempted from definition of gambling unlike season-long fantasy sports contests, which were exempted
by Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act).
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Meanwhile, the evolution of sports gambling in Illinois followed the national trend.19 By 2015, DraftKings, the competitor
chasing FanDuel for the market share, claimed to have more than
250,000 customers in Illinois and realized more than $90 million
that year in entry fees, such as the nine dollar fees Dew-Becker and
Wu each paid to place a wager against each other’s teams.20 The
size of the steadily growing DFS revenues should have served as a
call to timely action by state legislators.21
Although Dew-Becker presented the first time an Illinois citizen
sought to recover losses directly from the winner of a DFS competition, the issue of which party should bear the fallout of such contests was decades in the making.22 Since its advent, states,
corporations, and citizens have tried to capitalize on the moneymaking potential of DFS.23 Even the professionals whose statistics
[T]here is debate about whether DFS, as presently offered to consumers,
falls within the law’s fantasy sports “exemption.” It is also possible that
courts could determine that DFS is subject to a 1992 law, the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA; P.L. 102–559), which bans
sports betting in most states, and to various other federal and state gambling laws. This uncertainty has drawn the attention of Congress, with
some Members proposing to reexamine the legal status of the industry.
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44398. For further discussion of PASPA, see infra notes 95–96
and accompanying text.
19. See Grove, supra note 16 (providing national DFS market data); see also
Hustad, supra note 4 (providing customer statistics for DFS operator DraftKings in
Illinois).
20. See Hustad, supra note 4 (reporting Illinois market for DFS contests).
21. See Nicole Davidson, Comment, Internet Gambling: Should Fantasy Sports
Leagues Be Prohibited?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 208–09 (2002) (showing growth of
sports betting industry in early 2000s); see also Gouker, supra note 6 (explaining
legalization critical to achieving growth forecast).
22. See John T. Holden & Marc Edelman, Commentary, A Short Treatise on
Sports Gambling and the Law: How America Regulates Its Most Lucrative Vice, 2020 WIS.
L. REV. 907, 919 (2020) [hereinafter Sports Gambling] (“Beginning in 1990, major
American professional sports leagues began pressuring Congress to pass a law banning sports wagering throughout the country.”); see also Thomas Paschalis, The Legal Attack on Fantasy Sports, ILL. BUS. L.J. (Nov. 9, 2007) (referencing 2007 case,
Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., where “Colorado attorney sued the proprietors of three
pay-to-play fantasy sports sites, invoking several state qui tam statutes that allow for
‘private attorney generals’ to seek the recovery of losses incurred by gamblers”).
In Humphrey, the issue was whether attorney generals could recover season-long
fantasy sports fees from fantasy sports site operators as gambling losses, but the
court held that the fees were management fees for the costs of running the seasonlong league and would not hold that the fees were gambling losses or in the alternative that the games were illegal gambling under federal law. See Humphrey v.
Viacom, Inc., No. 06 2768, 2007 WL 1797648, *10–11 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (explaining motion to dismiss); see also Wilson v. Conlin, 3 Ill. App. 517, 518 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1878) (showing court deference to practice of organizations facilitating prizes,
requiring entry fees).
23. See Sports Gambling, supra note 22, at 921 (showing congressional attempts
to regulate online sports gaming dated to late 1990s when report identified market
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underlie DFS wanted their fair share of the business model.24
Largely left out of the discussion of divvying up the spoils was the
legality of its construct.25 Along with driving regulatory schemes for
new revenue opportunities, legislatures bear responsibility for considering whether there should be legislation to ameliorate the harm
and ensuing fallout from the money-making activities their citizens
pursue.26
Numerous states have loss recovery statutes.27 In Illinois, legislators give constituents two primary tools to combat loss of money
through illegal gambling: the Loss Recovery Act and the Dram
Shop Act.28 The Loss Recovery Act, at play in Dew-Becker, allows an
for activity at value of up to $380 billion annually) (referencing Nat’l Gambling
Impact Study Comm’n, Final Rep., at 2–14 (1999)); see also Darren Heitner, The Hyper
Growth Of Daily Fantasy Sports Is Going To Change Our Culture And Our Laws, FORBES
(Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2015/09/16/thehyper-growth-of-daily-fantasy-sports-is-going-to-change-our-culture-and-our-laws/
?sh=1770f3b5aca1 [https://perma.cc/ZV4N-V3KP] (discussing rate of growth in
contrast to age of DFS industry, potential legislative challenges plus legislator
interests).
24. See Marc S. Tabolsky & Richard B. Farrer, One League to Rule Them All?
Fantasy-Sports Leagues and Intellectual Property Rights, 45 ADVOC. 69, 70 (2008) (discussing intellectual property rights of sports leagues, teams, as well as publicity
rights); see also DFS Bill Tabled in Illinois, YOGONET (May 30, 2016), https://
www.yogonet.com/international/noticias/2016/05/30/39259-dfs-bill-tabled-in-illinois [https://perma.cc/QBY7-NUP4] (discussing casino industry’s interest in
blocking legalization of DFS internet-based operators).
25. For further discussion of the beginning of congressional interest in legislating the fantasy sports market, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
26. See Dowd, supra note 5, at 442 (discussing state’s use of gambling revenue
to help economy, noting state neglecting responsibility to its most vulnerable citizens); see also Sports Gambling, supra note 22, at 968 (noting social, actual costs associated with pathological gambling); Giri Nathan, Audacious Clown Tries To Win Back
$100 In Daily Fantasy Losses, By Going To Court Twice, DEADSPIN (Dec. 17, 2018, 9:57
AM), https://deadspin.com/audacious-clown-tries-to-win-back-100-in-daily-fantasy1831134985 [https://perma.cc/3M9E-PU88] (characterizing DFS player by saying
Dew-Becker “joined degenerates nationwide in a nightly ritual: blowing money on
daily fantasy sports”). For further discussion regarding tension created when
courts need to evaluate statutes, see infra notes 167–170.
27. See Stan Fox, State Laws on Ability to Recover Gambling Losses, LETS GAMBLE
USA (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.letsgambleusa.com/state-laws-on-ability-to-recover-gambling-losses/ [https://perma.cc/7CML-UDWF] (providing overview of
states’ loss recovery statutes); see also Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., 778
S.E.2d 888, 895-96 (S.C. 2015) (providing analysis under South Carolina statutes
for whether individuals could sue for loss recovery after engaging in either legalized or illegal gambling); Cassie Bible, Blurred Lines: A Future Where Social Gaming Is
the Newest Form of Gambling, 10 UNLV GAMING L.J. 143, 149–57 (2020) (providing
examples of recent cases in Illinois, Washington, Maryland implicating loss recovery statutes).
28. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-8 (West 2013) [hereinafter Loss Recovery Act] (excluding gambling on video games but allowing “[a]ny person who by
gambling shall lose to any other person, any sum of money or thing of value,
amounting to the sum of $50 or more and shall pay or deliver the same or any part
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individual to claim recovery of money lost to the winner of illegal
gambling between the two parties.29 The Dram Shop Act allows
family members to recover losses from the business that served the
losing gambler alcoholic beverages that may have contributed to
the gambling.30 A review of gambling recovery case law in Illinois
shows that gambling crosses the business and recreational planes.31
When Dew-Becker came before the courts, they had three tests
for gaming activities to determine whether they fell within illegal
gambling’s realm.32 The predominate purpose text, the any
chance test, and the materiality test offered three angles from
which to approach the analysis of disputed activities.33 First,the predominant purpose test relies on identifying whether the element of
chance or skill dominates the contest.34 Next, the any chance test
considers whether chance plays any role at all to find gambling.35
thereof, [to] sue for and recover the money or other thing of value, so lost and
paid or delivered, in a civil action against the winner thereof, with costs, in the
circuit court”); see also 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-21(a) (West 2006) [hereinafter Dram Shop Act] (allowing family members of overserved patrons to bring suit
against server for losses sustained as result of patron’s intoxicated status).
29. For further discussion regarding language of the Loss Recovery Act, see
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30. For further discussion regarding language of the Dram Shop Act, see
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., State Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Newton, 89 Ill. App. 353, 356 (1899)
(providing early example of someone trying to recover for life insurance policies as
lotteries when policies were new to market); see also Salzman v. Boeing, 26 N.E.2d
696, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940) (showing mid-nineteenth century wheat futures, puts
addressed by gambling laws); Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC, 173 F.
Supp. 3d 731, 733 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (introducing technology in modern era with
online casinos).
32. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 25 (Ill. 2020) (noting court had
not previously selected test but now decided predominate factor test would be
most appropriate one for court to use because state legislature was already using
test in other legislation).
33. See id. (citing Marc Edelman, Regulating Fantasy Sports: A Practical Guide to
State Gambling Laws, and A Proposed Framework for Future State Legislation, 92 IND. L.J.
653, 663-65 (2017) (“To address these difficulties and determine whether a contest
is one of skill and, hence, exempt from gambling laws, courts have applied three
general tests.”)).
34. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 22 (“Under this test, contests in
which the outcome is mathematically more likely to be determined by skill than
chance are not considered gambling.”); see also Andrew Tottenham, Skill or Chance
– Is It Legal? CDC GAMING REPS. (Mar. 6, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://
www.cdcgamingreports.com/commentaries/skill-or-chance-is-it-legal/ [https://
perma.cc/5AYU-6HKH] (“This test uses the extent to which superior skill overcomes the random element.”).
35. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 22 (“If there are any elements of
chance that can affect the outcome, regardless of the level of skill involved, it is
determined to be gambling.”).
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Finally, the materiality test considers how heavily chance weighs on
the contest’s final outcome.36
In Dew-Becker, the Illinois supreme court elected to use the predominant purpose test to determine whether DFS constituted gambling and thereby resolved a legislative gap.37 However, the DewBecker case history highlights the legal abyss created when innovation outpaces legislation.38 Afterall, the state legislature is responsible for drawing the lines where gambling crosses from legalized to
illegal activity.39
This Note addresses the holding in the Dew-Becker case’s final
iteration.40 In Part II, this Note shows that the court’s holding was
the product of the lower court rulings.41 Part III examines the
evolving attitudes toward gambling in Illinois, the legislature’s approach to dealing with the issue, and how the legislative process
formed a backdrop as Dew-Becker moved through the court system.42
Part IV argues that flexing statutory interpretation to its outermost
limit was the only remedy available to the court to address clear
36. See id. (“The material element test looks at whether the outcome depends
on chance to a material degree.”).
37. For further discussion regarding available tests, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
38. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 90 (Ill. Ct. App. 2018) (noting gap in
state law for regulating “gambling . . . facilitated through a third-party website”).
At least one congressional legislator did not consider that DFS would share the
same federal law treatment as season-long fantasy sports, which were exempted
from gambling under UIGEA. See Dustin Gouker, UIGEA Author: “No One Ever Conceived” That Law Would Allow Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 8, 2015),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/1369/uigea-author-did-not-intend-daily-fantasy-sports-carveout/ [https://perma.cc/W9NR-6JCW] (“The assumption was that
while unconstrained Internet gambling could change the nature of America’s savings and investment patterns, fantasy sports would be a ‘de minimis’ footnote. No
one ever conceived of it becoming a large scale activity or that it could transition
into one-day contests.”).
39. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85
(2018) (framing gambling laws as policy choices relegated to states). See generally
Phillips, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 739 (explaining legislators craft language broadly
enough to cover unanticipated technological advances involving activities legislation sought to outlaw).
40. See Dew-Becker v. Wu, No. 124472, 2020 Ill. LEXIS 565 (Sept. 28, 2020)
[hereinafter Dew-Becker, Petition Denied] (denying rehearing from series of appeals,
remands following initial trial). For further discussion of the final holding, see
infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
41. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 28 (interpreting Illinois Loss Recovery Act to apply only to gambling, finding DFS contests are games of skill, not
chance, not properly classified as gambling).
42. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 92 (noting legislature is contemplating various bills to allow regulated online sports gambling).
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errors created by the lower courts.43 Finally, this Note argues that
given the interstate nature of fantasy sports, the Illinois courts’ use
of statutory interpretation ultimately yielded an absurd result and
did not consider the national consequence to states reconciling
gambling laws and the federal government considering whether it
should intervene.44
II. FACTS: ESTABLISHING

THE

ELEMENTS

The Dew-Becker v. Wu story began on April 1, 2016, when Colin
Dew-Becker and Andrew Wu challenged each other to a DFS “contest.”45 The contest was over a basketball game via the DFS platform FanDuel.46 They each placed a $100 wager on the outcome
for a total prize of $200 to the winner.47 In addition to the individual wagers, each man paid FanDuel an entry fee of $9.48 When the
score was tallied at the end of the contest, Wu’s team had scored a
point total of more than double Dew-Becker’s team.49 Therefore,
per the terms of the contest, Wu collected the prize purse.50
43. For further discussion of the impact of the Supreme Court of Illinois’s
holding, see infra notes 216–225 and accompanying text.
44. See Laura R. Dove, Absurdity in Disguise: How Courts Create Statutory Ambiguity to Conceal Their Application of the Absurdity Doctrine, 19 NEV. L.J. 741, 743 (2019)
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (“The absurdity doctrine is a canon of statutory interpretation holding that a statute’s apparent ordinary meaning may be disregarded if the results of its application are (in some sense) absurd.”); see, e.g.,
John Brennan, Online Poker Now Legal in Illinois? One Judge Ruling on DFS Case Claims
It Is, USBETS (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.usbets.com/online-poker-legal-illinoisjudge-claims/ [https://perma.cc/5RSC-AMXD] (discussing impact of Dew-Becker
finding DFS games of skill on issue of poker). For further discussion of the consequences of the decision, see infra notes 216–225 and accompanying text.
45. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 4 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017) (“[Dew-Becker] and Wu engaged in a head-to-head Daily Fantasy Sports
(DFS) contest through FanDuel’s website.”).
46. See id. at *¶ 5 (“Dew-Becker and Wu each chose their DFS roster by selecting various NBA players.”).
47. See id. at *¶ 4 (explaining each man wagered “$100 on the outcome of the
contest for the opportunity to win $100 from the other”).
48. See id. at *¶ 5 (“[E]ach paid $109 to FanDuel, for a total of $218.”).
49. See id. (“At the conclusion of the contest, Dew-Becker . . . scored 96.30
points, and Wu . . . scored 221.10.”).
50. See id. (“As a result of scoring the highest total points, Wu won the $200
prize.”). The language selected by the court is noteworthy because language such
as “prize purse” was used in Humphrey, where the court dismissed a claim for winnings. See Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06 2768 DMC, 2007 WL 1797648, at *2
(D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (holding winnings were better understood as prize). A subsequent case distinguished this holding by finding it inapplicable to Kentucky law,
which allows the Commonwealth to bring loss recovery actions on behalf of others.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings (IOM) Ltd., 617
S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2020) (discussing lack of precedential value of unpublished
N.J. opinion when plaintiff tried to use Humphrey as support for its motion to
dismiss).
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Three days later, Dew-Becker filed a claim against Wu under
the Illinois Loss Recovery Act to recover his alleged gambling
losses.51 Three years later, the Illinois court system’s convoluted attempt to provide housekeeping for its state legislature’s outdated
gambling statutes ended finally.52 The case’s pathway up and down
the court levels highlights that the court’s effort at each stage focused on finding a justifiable way to reject recovery for DewBecker.53 This section of the Note provides an overview of the facts
and distinguishing comments of each iteration of judicial review.54
A. Trying Out Material
Dew-Becker began his saga in the court system by representing
himself.55 Within ten minutes of the trial’s start, the judge rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant.56 He asked only a total of
two questions from Dew-Becker.57 Then, when issuing his judgment in favor of the defendant, the judge gave his reasoning as
Dew-Becker had brought the claim for recovery against the wrong
party, stating that FanDuel would have been the proper
defendant.58
51. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st), at *¶ 4 (citing Loss Recovery Act)
(“[H]e brought a statutory cause of action pursuant to section 28–8 of the Criminal Code . . . after he sustained a monetary loss of $100 as a result of a wager with
Wu that was placed just three days earlier on April 1, 2016.”); see also Kmarko, Dude
Sues FanDuel After Losing a Head to Head NBA Matchup By 124.8 Points, BARSTOOL
SPORTS (Dec. 17, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.barstoolsports.com/blog/1173356/
dude-sues-fanduel-after-losing-a-head-to-head-nba-matchup-by-124-8-points
[https://perma.cc/9V2L-CBCL] (questioning how Dew-Becker lost so badly, speculating he lost on purpose).
52. See Dew-Becker, Petition Denied, No. 124472, 2020 Ill. LEXIS 565 (Sep.
28, 2020) (denying plaintiff’s petition for rehearing of case that began in May 2016
with lack of due process at circuit court, lowest level in Illinois court system).
53. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 7 (showing judge
asked two questions of plaintiff, three of defendant, before delivering not guilty
verdict in favor of defendant).
54. For further discussion of the procedural history, see supra notes 45–52
and accompanying text; see also infra notes 55–81 and accompanying text.
55. See Court Docket, Dev [sic] Becker v. Wu, No. 2016-M1-011598 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr
04, 2016), https://courtlink.lexisnexis.com/cookcounty/FindDock.aspx?NCase=
2016-M1-011598&SearchType=0&Database=1&case_no=&PLtype=1&sname
=&CDate= [https://perma.cc/2XEB-2T9M] (showing pro se representation by
plaintiff for initial bench trial, attorney representation on subsequent appeals).
56. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 7 (documenting
length of trial).
57. See id. (showing judge asked plaintiff two questions: “And are you employed by FanDuel?” and “What is your general theory of this case?”)
58. See id. (“It seems to me that in order to make this claim, you would need
to bring an action against FanDuel.”). The only reason there is a record of what
transpired is that the parties “filed a stipulated bystander’s report.” See id. (“The
record does not contain a transcript or report of the proceedings.”). The judge
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In short order, Dew-Becker filed an appeal.59 He offered the
appellate court three arguments for his appeal: “[T]he trial court
failed to conduct a trial, the court’s judgment was contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court’s basis for dismissal was erroneous.”60 The appellate court found that DewBecker’s claim merited a trial, that the circuit court had denied him
due process, and that the constitution required the circuit court to
provide an actual trial.61 Therefore, the appellate court remanded
the case for trial.62
When Dew-Becker returned to the circuit court, he was represented by counsel.63 While testifying, Dew-Becker said that he tried
to put together a winning team, but that the competition at the
wager’s heart involved both luck and skill.64 His description of the

may have had the issue of whether the sports betting hosts could be sued at the
forefront of his mind due to the Langone v. Kaiser case. See Langone v. Kaiser, 12 C
2073, 2013 WL 5567587, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013) (holding complaint would be
dismissed because defendant not liable under Loss Recovery Act as website operators did not participate in risk). There, the plaintiff sought to analogize DFS operators to brokers. See Langone, 2013 WL 5567587, at *6 (citing Pearce v. Foote, 113
Ill. 228, 238 (1885)) (“The court in Pearce held that even though the brokers derived profit from the commissions as opposed to the gain from the illegal trades or
‘wagers,’ the brokers were nonetheless ‘actively participating [as] principals’ in the
illegal gambling activity.”).
59. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶¶ 7–8 (showing twoweek turnaround from initial judgment to Dew-Becker’s notice of appeal).
60. See id. at *¶ 10 (noting appellate court only considered Dew-Becker’s argument that “trial court failed to conduct a trial”).
61. See id. at *¶¶ 11–14 (showing court took time to explain constitutional
concerns of circuit court having denied Dew-Becker due process).
62. See id. at *¶ 10 (noting court did not need to address Dew-Becker’s two
additional arguments since circuit court judge had ruled without ever holding
trial).
63. See Court Docket, Dev [sic] Becker Colin v. Wu Andrew, No. 2016-M1-011598
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016), https://courtlink.lexisnexis.com/cookcounty/FindDock.aspx?NCase=2016-M1-011598&SearchType=0&Database=1&case_no=&PLtype=1&sname=&CDate= [https://perma.cc/
P2GK-36WD] (showing representation by attorney began with his initial notice of
appeal of first decision).
64. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (describing
spread between performance of plaintiff’s, defendant’s teams while comparing
DFS contest to “betting on a horse in a horse race”). But see Kmarko, supra note 51
(implying Dew-Becker must have intentionally lost, reasoning lineup he selected
for contest lacked logic if goal was to win).
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contest matched the Illinois statute defining gambling.65 Unfortunately for Dew-Becker, the holding remained unchanged.66
Seemingly undaunted, Dew-Becker appealed again.67 The appellate court agreed to hear the case to review statutory interpretation.68 On his new appeal, Dew-Becker argued that the circuit
court incorrectly interpreted the Loss Recovery Act’s language.69
The appellate court found that the DFS contest “qualified as gambling.”70 The court then provided a lengthy explanation regarding

65. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1(a)(1) (West 2016) (“A person commits gambling when he or she: knowingly plays a game of chance or skill for
money or other thing of value, unless excepted [sic] in subsection (b) of this Section . . .”). The statute further covers when an individual “knowingly makes a wager upon the result of any game, contest, or any political nomination,
appointment or election.” See id. at 5/28-1(a)(2). Meanwhile, legislators exempted some activities from gambling. See e.g., id. at 5/28-1(b)(“(2) Offers of
prizes, award or compensation to the actual contestants in any bona fide contest for
the determination of skill, speed, strength or endurance . . . .”) (emphasis added);
id. (“(13) Games of skill or chance where money or other things of value can be
won but no payment or purchase is required to participate.”).
66. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 87 (showing agreement with trial court’s
opinion finding in favor of Wu after case was remanded); see also Dew-Becker I,
2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 4 (Ill. 2020) (showing trial was bench trial). During the
second trial, defendant Wu made the case that the wager was not a head-to-head
contest. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 88-89 (arguing role of FanDuel as “mediator of their wager” prevented parties from having gambled directly with each other
as required to be in violation of statute). He also said that the gambling activity
was not an illegal activity. See id. at 89 (citing to fact participants did not need to
know each other, in which case it could not be described as head-to-head wager).
Lastly, he argued that the Illinois Loss Recovery Act was inapplicable to the activity.
See id. (“[T]he act was not meant to apply.”).
67. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 87 (“Plaintiff, Colin Dew-Becker, appeals
the trial court’s decision in favor of defendant, Andrew Wu, after a bench trial.”).
68. For further discussion of statutory review, see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
69. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 87 (“Plaintiff argues that in reaching its
decision, the trial court erroneously interpreted section 28-8 of the Criminal Code
of 2012 . . . which provides a cause of action for damages to the loser of certain
illegal bets against the winner of the bets.”); see also id. at 87 n.1 (noting statute 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-8 did not have short title but would be referred to as “Illinois Loss Recovery Act”).
70. See id. at 90 (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1(b) (West 2019))
(describing DFS contest as “a game of chance, a game of skill, or some combination thereof and that none of the exceptions enumerated in section 28-1(b)
apply.”).
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how the statute should be interpreted.71 Still, in the end, DewBecker lost again.72
B. Final Disposition: Clawed Off the Stage
Undaunted by the lecture on the legislative process, DewBecker next appealed his case to the Supreme Court of Illinois.73
There, the court agreed with the appellate court’s ruling, finding in
favor of the defendant.74 Nonetheless, the affirmed ruling covered
the fact that the highest court made some corrections to the appellate court’s analysis.75
Pursuing a different tack, the state’s highest court first held
that the appellate court incorrectly identified DFS contests as gambling.76 Then the court declared that the Loss Recovery Act did not
71. See id. at 90–92 (exploring results of application if only plain reading was
used, ignoring legislative intent); see also Andrew M. Sachs, You Can’t Win for Losing,
ROBBINS, SALOMON & PATT, LTD., https://rsplaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/
10/you-cant-win-for-losing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N9N-9SMR] (last visited Feb.
8, 2021) (describing appellate court outcome, characterizing appellate court reasoning as “somewhat tortured”).
72. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 92 (“We decline to interpret the Illinois
Loss Recovery Act in a manner that would frustrate its purpose and yield an absurd
result, and affirm the trial court’s decision in favor of defendant.”); see also Douglas
Charles, Guy tries To Get the $100 He Lost Playing Daily Fantasy Back By Going to Court
. . . Twice, BROBIBLE (Dec. 18, 2019), https://brobible.com/sports/article/100lost-daily-fantasy-going-court/ [https://perma.cc/9PJ8-RUP3] (“[T]he Appellate
Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth division, (yes, his case made it that far), agreed
with the small claims court’s initial decision that Dew-Becker was simply S.O.L.”).
73. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶¶ 6–9 (Ill. 2020) (reviewing case’s
path to Supreme Court).
74. See id. at *¶ 1 (“[W]e hold that recovery is unavailable.”).
75. See id. at *¶ 13 (explaining court agreed with outcome but disagreed with
basis for appellate court’s finding); see also John Holden, Finally an End to Years of
Madness in the Illinois DFS Saga, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://
www.legalsportsreport.com/40106/illinois-dfs-case-draftkings-fanduel/ [https://
perma.cc/UY8W-PHT3] (“Instead of creating legal fictions and ruling on a technicality, [the ruling] cut to the heart of [the] issue . . . whether these [DFS] contests
constituted legal games of skill.”). See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 13 (explaining disagreement with reasoning). For further discussion of the court’s rationale, see Anzel, infra note 77 and accompanying text.
76. See id. at *¶ 21 (“Although we do not find the appellate court’s reasoning
persuasive, we nevertheless agree that the judgment of the appellate court should
be affirmed because the DFS contest at issue here was not gambling.”); see also
William M. Gantz, Illinois Supreme Court Finds Daily Fantasy Sports to Be Legal, Rejects
DFS Loser’s Gambling Loss Recovery Act Claim, LEXOLOGY (May 1, 2020), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=D0d33b6c-4436-4d7c-aaa2-76616f7cfb4a
[https://perma.cc/S28Y-NH83] (highlighting Supreme Court of Illinois elected to
evaluate “whether Dew-Becker and Wu were engaged in a bona fide contest for the
determination of skill in order to fit under the exception presented by 720 ILCS
5/28-1(b)(2), a question of first impression in Illinois”).
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apply.77 Thus, the majority opinion held that Dew-Becker could
not win his lawsuit because DFS contests did not qualify as
gambling.78
The holding of the Illinois supreme court lacked unanimity,
however.79 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Karmeier observed
the recent passage of the Illinois Sports Wagering Act.80 Despite his
disagreement with the majority, he noted that the law’s enactment
would end individuals’ abilities to use the Loss Recovery Act to recover losses.81
III. BACKGROUND: THE SETUP
By the time Colin Dew-Becker headed to court in 2016, DFS
had become a significant income generator.82 As the market con77. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 28 (“Because the outcomes of headto-head DFS contests are predominately skill based, we conclude that plaintiff was
not engaged in ‘gambling’ with defendant as required under section 28-8(a).”); see
also Rebecca Anzel, Centuries-Old Law Cannot Be Used to Reclaim Lost Wager, State
Supreme Court Rules, CAPITOL NEWS ILL. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://capitolnewsillinois.
com/NEWS/centuries-old-law-cannot-be-used-to-reclaim-lost-wager-state-supremecourt-rules [https://perma.cc/PN8Y-WF2H] (discussing Illinois Loss Recovery Act
history, summarizing court “ruled that while nothing in the act’s language omits
internet contests from its purview, daily fantasy sports bets do not fit the definition
of gambling as dictated by law”).
78. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 21 (“[T]he DFS contest at issue
here was not gambling.”).
79. See id. at *¶ 32 (providing dissent by Justice Karmeier, anchoring his opinion on proposition majority disregarded its own reasoning). “[T]he majority
oddly ignores its own statement of the test and finds DFS is a contest of skill based
on the results of statistical studies.” See id. at *¶ 34 (Karmeier, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at *¶ 47 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (referencing “Pub. Act 101-31
(eff. June 28, 2019) (adding 230 ILCS 45/25-1 et seq.)” in dissenting opinion).
81. See id. (“While the Act has no bearing on this case, the ability to recover
losses from DFS contests, when played in accordance with the Act, has now come
to an end.”) (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1(b)(15) (West 2019)). The
Sports Wagering Act defined “sports wagering” to include a non-exhaustive list of
bets based on portions of events and various types of bets. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 45/25-10 (West 2019) [hereinafter Sports Wagering Act] (providing list of
examples to include “single-game bets, teaser bets, parlays, over-under, moneyline,
pools, exchange wagering, in-game wagering, in-play bets, proposition bets, and
straight bets”); see also Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 47 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“Although the Act does not explicitly reference [DFS], it
defines ‘sports wagering’ as ‘accepting wagers on sports events or portions of
sports events, or on the individual performance statistics of athletes in a sports
event or combination of sports events, by any system or method of wagering, including, but not limited to, in person or over the Internet through websites and on
mobile devices.’ ”).
82. See Heitner, supra note 6 (projecting as early as 2013 DFS would constitute
majority of fantasy sports play, recognizing DFS role in television advertising, investing); see also Daniel Roberts, The Daily Fantasy Sports Market Has a Demographic
Problem, YAHOO FIN. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-dailyfantasy-sports-market-has-a-demographic-problem-133011359.html?guccounter=
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tinued to grow for DFS, the major companies involved saw staggering revenues.83 Meanwhile, the legislature was attempting to
harness the potential income of online sports play and regulate it.84
Furthermore, the 2018 Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association Supreme Court ruling invalidating the federal government’s
ability to dictate state participation in the online gaming scene led
to an increased market for online fantasy sports play.85 These concerns were at the forefront of the minds of the justices hearing
Dew-Becker’s final appeal.86
Although this Case Note focuses on the Supreme Court of Illinois’s statutory interpretation of its gambling statutes, following its
exposition requires a basic understanding of evolving attitudes
about gambling and the interstate nature of online gambling to
provide context for the final holding.87 Therefore, Subsection A of
1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_
sig=AQAAABVVcGJf20kendkY6e_gP2eZeTHHcSWRe5S2arwOam
VeBxNydzUgxRSb8CgncZBFY1Pv8ZbJBBqsexe1AosLqr_RcD7FP41y3tZ9F147Or
9VRs-o80Umxmc9nG4zOU8B9TDMfq2GaNxykVx2ldPKrHIL5mhV6FGn
5BFd1FTfww8w [https://perma.cc/B3HT-Q2W7] (showing DFS entry fees in 2016
of $3.26 billion).
83. See, e.g., Brad Allen, FanDuel Group Adds Nearly Half a Million Users in Q3, on
Track for $1.1 Billion In Annual Revenue, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Nov. 12, 2020), https:/
/www.legalsportsreport.com/45669/fanduel-q3-results/ [https://perma.cc/Z8VUEX3Z] (“We have enhanced the customer experience, secured further strategic
media partnerships and acquired more new customers than anticipated. And we
are on track to generate more than $1.1 billion of GGR (gross gaming revenue) in
the [United States] this year.”).
84. See YOGONET, supra note 24 (discussing eagerness of legislators to move
enact regulation); see also ILL. ATT’Y GEN. OP., infra note 97 (discussing 2015 opinion by Illinois attorney general saying current law precluded DFS wagers).
85. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018)
(“Just as Congress lacks the power to order a state legislature not to enact a law
authorizing sports gambling, it may not order a state legislature to refrain from
enacting a law licensing sports gambling.”). See generally Sports Gambling, supra note
22, at 909 (“[T]he emergence of legalized, regulated sports gambling has transformed a lucrative black market into an open market.”).
86. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (“At this time,
there are a number of bills before the Illinois legislature that propose the legalization and regulation of sports gambling.”).
87. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 1084 (LexisNexis 2021) (providing for imprisonment for transferring wages by wire from state where gambling is illegal into state
where gambling is legal); see also Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to NonSports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2018) [hereinafter O.L.C.] (reviewing Wire Act
in connection to Illinois state lottery, opining section 1084(a) of Wire Act
“criminalizes transmitting ‘information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on
any sporting event or contest’ . . . . The 2006 enactment of the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act did not alter the scope of section 1084(a).”). This was
a reversal of a 2011 opinion by the United States Department of Justice Office for
Legal Counsel that said the Wire Act only prohibited sports gambling. See O.L.C.
(“This Office concluded in 2011 that the prohibitions of the Wire Act in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084(a) are limited to sports gambling. Having been asked to reconsider, we
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this Section of the Note offers the historical background of online
fantasy sports gambling.88 Subsection B addresses some of the reasons states regulate gambling.89 In addition, Subsection C examines the statutes and policies in play while Dew-Becker pursued his
claim.90 Finally, this Section reviews policy considerations for characterizing online gaming opportunities, such as DFS.91
A. Illinois Law Before the Murphy Decision
Over time, Illinois created rules, carve-outs, and recovery
mechanisms for gambling via the Illinois Gambling Act, the Video
Gaming Act, the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and
the Loss Recovery Act.92 Together, the statutes provided the
boundaries for what constituted legal recreational activity.93 When
now conclude that the statutory prohibitions are not uniformly limited to gambling on sporting events or contests.”). Contra Anthony R. Holtzman, Sports and
Only Sports: 1st Circuit Addresses Scope of the Wire Act, 9 NAT’L L. REV. 27 (2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sports-and-only-sports-1st-circuit-addressesscope-wire-act [https://perma.cc/N7LD-ZTFK] (“Aligning itself with the 5th Circuit, the 1st Circuit concluded that, in all of its applications, the Wire Act covers
only bets and wagers that are placed on sporting events and not bets and wagers
that are placed on things like lottery, poker, and casino games.”).
88. See Edelman, supra note 8, at 9–10 (presenting overview of online fantasy
sports play).
89. See, e.g., Michael Mayerck, Gambling Granny: The Elderly’s Propensity for Gambling Addiction and the Need for Effective Legal and Legislative Remedies to Prevent It, 27
ELDER L.J. 187, 195 (2019) (highlighting, e.g., dangers of gambling associated with
elderly individuals but noting “state without gambling may suffer the adverse consequences that are caused by gambling, without receiving the benefit of increased
revenue”).
90. For further discussion of the statutes, see infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
91. See James G. Gatto & Mark A. Patrick, How the Evolution of Games Has Led to
a Rise in Gambling Concerns: All Bets are On! Gambling and Video Games, 8 NAT’L L.R.
259 (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-evolution-gameshas-led-to-rise-gambling-concerns-all-bets-are-gambling-and [https://perma.cc/
3CZ6-92M3] (presenting overview of types of online gaming including popular online activities).
92. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1 (West 2019) [hereinafter Gambling
Act] (providing broad definition of gambling activity); see also 230 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 45/25-1 (West 2019) (exempting online sports betting from gambling prohibition); 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/70 (West 2009) [hereinafter Video Gaming
Act] (exempting certain devices from characterization as gambling devices); 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1 (West 2007) [hereinafter Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act] (allowing recovery of losses when casinos overserve patrons);
see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-8 (West 2013) (allowing third-party recovery of gambling losses under certain time constraints, over certain dollar amounts,
when gamblers were known to each other).
93. See KIMBERLY C. SIMMONS, 38 C.J.S. GAMING § 27 (2021) (“[T]he right to
gamble legally is provided inasmuch as the legislature allows . . . [l]icensed gaming
is a privilege conferred by the state.”).
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the Dew-Becker case began in 2017, the Illinois Sports Wagering Act
was not yet law.94
In addition, the court conducted its review of the Illinois statutes against the backdrop of the Murphy case, which was underway.95 The law at issue in Murphy had effectively prohibited states
from legalizing sports gambling96 In fact, just one year before DewBecker brought his claim, the Illinois State Attorney General declared that DFS contests were illegal.97
B. Federal Landscape
At the federal level, legislators began working on regulating
social sports gambling activity in the 1990s.98 Research showed that
legalizing sports gambling would have adverse socio-economic impacts.99 Therefore, in 1992, federal legislators enacted the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).100 Although
the Wire Act, enacted in 1961, also addressed sports gambling, its
focus was on disrupting organized crime.101 The 2006 Unlawful In94. For further discussion of the Sports Wagering Act, see infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
95. See generally Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461,
1475 (2018) (conducting review of constitutionality of PASPA in relation to state
sovereignty). For additional discussion of PASPA, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
96. See id. at 1470 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1)) (PASPA “generally makes it
unlawful for a State to ‘authorize’ sports gambling schemes”).
97. See ILL. ATT’Y GEN., OP. NO. 15-006, SPORTS AND GAMING: DAILY FANTASY
SPORTS CONTESTS AND GAMBLING (2015) (writing to Illinois Judiciary Criminal
Committee chairperson, “You have inquired whether daily fantasy sports contests
offered by FanDuel and DraftKings (collectively Contest Organizers) constitute
‘gambling’ under Illinois law. For the reasons stated . . . it is my opinion that the
contests in question constitute illegal gambling . . . and the exemption set forth . . .
does not apply”).
98. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470 (recognizing relaxation of laws related to
gambling resulting in federal legislators trying to address issue).
99. See Phil Ciciora, Expert: Legal Sports Gambling Will Have a Destabilizing Effect
on Economy, Sports, ILL. NEWS BUREAU (May 15, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://
news.illinois.edu/view/6367/650811#:~:text=%E2%80%94%20The%20recent
%20U.S.%20Supreme%20Court,a%20leading%20national%20gambling%20critic
[https://perma.cc/2GBX-S5MH] (quoting Illinois business professor regarding
impact of Murphy decision stating, “there are ‘$3 to $7 in taxpayer costs for every
$1 in tax revenues from casinos’ — and . . . sports gambling and internet gambling
carry even higher socio-economic costs”).
100. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470 (“PASPA’s proponents argued that it would
protect young people, and one of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Bill Bradley of New
Jersey, a former college and professional basketball star, stressed that the law was
needed to safeguard the integrity of sports.”).
101. See Sports Gambling, supra note 22, at 960 (citing The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearing on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1656, S.
1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 6 (1961)
(statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States)) (discussing
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ternet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”) prohibited individuals and businesses from accepting payment for illegal internetbased betting for the express purpose of consumer protection.102
Across the nation, state governments were eager to harness a
share of DFS revenue.103 Then, Murphy invalidated the PASPA.104
That change opened the path to legalizing sports betting on a stateby-state basis.105
C. Illinois Law Post Murphy
The Illinois legislature finally passed sports betting law in Illinois in June 2019.106 The legalization of sports betting immediately
comments by attorney general). For further discussion of the Wire Act, see supra
note 87 and accompanying text.
102. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–67 (2006) (defining purpose of Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act); see id. §5361 (providing history of 1999 governmental
study plus rationale for legislation). “Internet gambling is a growing cause of debt
collection problems for insured depository institutions and the consumer credit
industry. New mechanisms for enforcing gambling laws on the Internet are necessary because traditional law enforcement mechanisms are often inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions or regulations on the Internet, especially where
such gambling crosses State or national borders.” Id.
103. See Jake Lestock, Tackling Daily Fantasy Sports in the States, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/tackling-daily-fantasy-sports-in-the-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/88X5EYZZ] (“Since 2015, 43 states have introduced legislation relating to fantasy sports.
Nineteen states have enacted laws to legalize paid-entry fantasy sports, generally
with two goals in mind: first, to create legal clarity, regulations and safeguards for
their residents, and second, to raise revenue.”).
104. For further discussion of the Murphy holding, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
105. See Patrick Moran, Anyone’s Game: Sports-Betting Regulations After Murphy v.
NCAA, CATO INST. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.cato.org/legal-policy-bulletin/
anyones-game-sports-betting-regulations-after-murphy-v-ncaa#changes-at-the-statelevel [https://perma.cc/SH8P-5HRE] (“In sum, an overwhelming majority of
states have changed or are working to change their policies in response to Murphy.
Only 12 states have not introduced legislation on sports betting since Murphy and 4
were already exempt from PASPA, although they may expand their existing operations. The remaining states have either passed a bill, amended their constitution,
made a tribal compact, or are attempting to do one of the three.”).
106. See The Essentials About Illinois Sports Betting, ON TAP SPORTS NET (Sept. 10,
2020), https://ontapsportsnet.com/2020/09/10/the-essentials-about-illinoissports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/Q7EB-QSAM] (providing overview of legalization of sports betting in Illinois). “The first legal sports wager was made at Rivers
Casino Des Plaines on March 9 [2020].” Id. In June 2019, the legislature finally
passed a sports gambling bill. See Andy Faust, Illinois Passes Omnibus Gaming Bill,
Includes Legal Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS BETTING (June 3, 2019, 11:53 AM),
https://www.legalsportsbetting.com/news/illinois-passes-omnibus-gaming-bill-includes-legal-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/X7UK-AL5G] (“State budgeters expect a first-year windfall of between $500 million and $700 million from the
licenses associated with the state’s gambling expansion.”). For further discussion
of the Sports Wagering Act, see supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also infra
note 165 and accompanying text.
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impacted consumer spending in the state.107 At the time, Illinois
predicted its legalization would generate $700 million in tax revenue in its first year.108
The exception the Dew-Becker court carved out for DFS is not
problematic on its face.109 At the state and federal levels, other legislatures were making similar determinations, and courts were interpreting their statutes.110 Furthermore, as Dew-Becker emphasized
during his trial, the Illinois legislature had an existing practice of
carving out exceptions for gambling activities, such as bingo and
the state lottery.111 The developing case law showed that legislatures needed to create more explicit regulations for both operators
and players.112
107. See Ben Kovach, Looking Back at Illinois’ First Year of Sports Betting, US BET(Jan. 9, 2021), https://usbettingreport.com/sports-betting/looking-back-at-illinois-first-year-of-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/JZD7-SXZT] (highlighting
revenue generated by sports betting in time since its legalization in state).
In 2020 . . . Illinois’ total sports betting handle was $941.7 million. $68
million of those wagers were placed in person while the vast majority,
$873.7 million, was placed online. That nearly $1 billion total sports betting handle immediately places Illinois amongst the top sports betting
states in the country.
See id. (noting extent of revenue earned during seven-month period which excluded first three months of year captured by other states in comparison).
108. See Rob Goldberg, Illinois State Legislature Passes Bill Legalizing Sports Gambling, TURNER SPORTS NETWORK BLEACHER REP. (June 2, 2019), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2839153-illinois-state-legislature-passes-bill-legalizing-sportsgambling [https://perma.cc/C3TY-UWHS] (explaining in addition to tax revenue, state will require $10 million licensing fee option for sports venues such as
Wrigley Field). In addition to increasing state revenue, DFS play could help fill
federal coffers via an excise tax. See Tony Nitti, In Recent Ruling, IRS Again Concludes that Daily Fantasy Sports Are Gambling, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2020), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2020/10/19/in-recent-ruling-irs-again-con
cludes-that-daily-fantasy-sports-are-gambling/?sh=53d67a3f437f [https://
perma.cc/YR4L-LPX2] (“Most importantly, whether DFS is a game of skill for state
gambling statute purposes is not relevant for determining whether DFS is wagering
for federal excise tax purposes.”).
109. See Ryan Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State Tracker, ESPN (Feb.
18, 2016), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799449/daily-fantasy-dfs-legal-your-state-state-state-look [https://perma.cc/R4GM-FRAL] (providing overview of states creating carve-outs for DFS play, including sports betting).
110. See Edelman, supra note 8, at 29–34 (providing examples of how states
vary in regulatory approach).
111. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (using lack of
carve-out for DFS in state code to indicate legislature would have specifically exempted DFS from gambling if it intended to do so). The state had recently revised
the criminal code, which included carveouts for bingo, lotteries, raffles, pull tabs
and jar games. See id. at 92 (citing 720 ILL.COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1(b) (West
2014)).
112. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 12472, at *¶ 26 (Ill. 2020) (“At this time there
are a number of bills before the Illinois legislature that propose . . . the regulation
of sports gambling.”). For further discussion of applicable state laws, see supra
notes 92–94 and accompanying text. Additionally, other laws, such as those reTING
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: THE PREMISE
The courts’ analyses of the Dew-Becker saga anchored itself in
the statutory realm from the beginning.113 The circuit court judge
reasoned that Dew-Becker had brought the claim for recovery
against the wrong party.114 By the time the case concluded, the
analysis had traversed plain language, legislative intent, and
outside, scientific research that had not even been entered into
evidence.115
This Section of the Case Note illustrates how the holdings that
emerged from each court review contributed to the final holding:
DFS contests are predominantly games of skill and, therefore, not
gambling.116 First, Subsection A presents the trial court errors that
led to remand.117 Next, Subsection B discusses how the appellate
court tailored its reasoning to uphold the trial court judgment.118
Finally, Subsection C shows how the state supreme court was
backed into a corner by the contradictory analysis of the lower
court rulings and the slow-moving legislature.119
garding federal taxation, interface with state gambling laws. See, e.g., Nitti, supra
note 108 (explaining reasoning for how Internal Revenue Service justified allowing
entry fees for DFS contests to offset winnings from competitions). Intellectual
property rights are another factor that has been considered more recently. See
Tabolsky, supra note 24 (offering discussion surrounding intellectual property
rights implicated by DFS business model, such as publicity rights).
113. For further discussion of claim elements as understood by the lower
court, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
114. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 7 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017) (showing question from judge indicating judge thought Dew-Becker had
sued wrong party under Loss Recovery Act).
115. For further discussion of studies cited by the majority, see infra note 157
and accompanying text.
116. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 28 (“Because the outcomes of
head-to-head DFS contests are predominantly skill based we conclude that plaintiff
was not engaged in ‘gambling’ with defendant as required under section 288(a).”).
117. For further discussion of trial court errors, see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
118. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (citing to
Goldfine v. Barack, Ferrazzono, Kirschbaum & Perlman, 12 N.E.3d 884 (Ill. 2014))
(“Although we typically determine whether a trial court’s decision after a bench
trial was against the manifest weight of the evidence (Garden View, LLC v.
Fletcher, 916 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. 2009)), we apply a de novo standard where, as here,
we are faced with a question of statutory interpretation.”).
119. See generally Steve Berkowitz & Tom Schad, Your State-By-State Guide to
Sports Betting in Light of Supreme Court Ruling, U.S.A. TODAY (May 14, 2018, 7:47
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/05/14/sports-gambling-status-every-state-after-supreme-court-ruling/607334002/ [https://perma.cc/P7U3YZ4L] (explaining timing of legislative action by states in response to Murphy v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n decision). “ ‘The largest group of states will wait until
2019 because they are out of session or almost out of session,’ Grave said. ‘. . . That
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BE FIRST120

The record capturing the first trial’s events shows the judge
issued a ruling without conducting a trial.121 Documentation of the
court’s analysis emerged from a bystander’s report.122 When the
judge issued his ruling in favor of the defendant, he commented
that the target of Dew-Becker’s claim was misplaced.123 In the moment, Dew-Becker challenged the reasoning.124
The lack of due process earned Dew-Becker a return trip to the
circuit court.125 Although the judge afforded Dew-Becker the opportunity to present testimony on his second appearance, the outcome remained the same even with the opportunity to be heard.126
The court pinned its denial of recovery on the Loss Recovery Act’s
inapplicability to the facts of Dew-Becker’s claim.127 In its analysis,
the court held that the act was gambling but that Dew-Becker could
not recover because not everyone who uses a third-party platform
might seem strange because it’s so early in this year, but that’s how the political
work calendar works.’ ” Id.
120. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 6 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017) (showing lack of Illinois DFS decisions on issue). Dew-Becker’s original
complaint shows that when he filed his lawsuit, Illinois courts had not yet ruled on
whether DFS play constituted gambling. See id. at *¶ 4 (“Dew–Becker’s complaint
recognized that Illinois courts have yet to address whether participating in DFS
contests is considered gambling, but argued that DFS should be considered as
such.”). By the time the case finished three years later, Illinois’s legislature had
finally enacted a statute to legalize sports gambling in the state. See Illinois Senate
Gaming Expansion, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/illinois-senate-gaming-expansion [https://perma.cc/UM7L-6DLP]
(providing details of roll out of Sports Wagering Act). For further discussion of
the legislative landscape, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
121. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 10 (“We agree with
his contention that the trial court failed to conduct a trial.”).
122. See id. at *¶ 7 (“[T]he parties filed a stipulated bystander’s report.”).
123. For further discussion of the lower court’s comments, see supra note 58
and accompanying text. In 2019, an Illinois case explored comprehensively the
idea of “winner” per the state’s Loss Recovery Act. See Anderson v. Naperville Rotary Charities Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 180312-U, at *¶ 14 (Ill. App. 2019) (analyzing
issue of word winner in Loss Recovery Act while reviewing relevant cases at state,
federal levels brought under Illinois Loss Recovery Act).
124. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 7 (asking, “Even
though Mr. Wu and I are the ones who risked the money?”).
125. See id. at *¶ 2 (listing three reasons Dew-Becker cited for appeal: “the
court below erred in failing to conduct a trial, its judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the basis for dismissal was erroneous”).
126. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (holding DewBecker could not recover loss of funds to Wu).
127. See id. at 90 (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-8(a) (West 2013)) (noting
statute did not apply because of language stating, “[a]ny person who by gambling
shall lose to any other person”).
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knows their opponent by name.128 Since FanDuel facilitated the
gambling activity, the court held that the Loss Recovery Act’s plain
meaning precluded recovery because the wager was not directly between Dew-Becker and Wu.129 Dew-Becker appealed again.130
B. Missing the Mark
On Dew-Becker’s second trip to the appellate court, he had
counsel.131 The court accepted for the sake of argument that it
would presume that the contest between Dew-Becker and Wu was a
gambling contest.132 It then began considering the applicability of
the Loss Recovery Act to DFS gambling.133 Without a finalized
sports gaming statute, the appellate court said that the “dearth of
decisions within the past six decades that analyze the [Loss Recovery] Act indicate that its relevance and applicability have dwindled
since its inception in the late 1800s.”134
Next, the court examined the statute’s language, which provided that one party must lose to another person.135 Acknowledging that the two parties in the lawsuit knew each other, the court
128. For further discussion of statutory language application by the circuit
court, see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
129. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 89 (“The plain meaning of the [s]tatute
does not allow recovery when the gambling is not connected — conducted between one person and another person, in this case, because of FanDuel.”).
130. See id. at 87 (showing matter on appeal from circuit court level).
131. For further discussion of Dew-Becker’s transition from pro se representation to representation by attorney, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
132. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 90 (comparing DFS contest to description
of gambling in state gambling statute, saying, “[w]e find that the DFS contest at
issue was a game of chance, a game of skill, or some combination thereof and that
none of the exceptions enumerated in section 28-1(b) apply. Therefore, we assume arguendo that plaintiff’s and defendant’s participation in the head-to-head
DFS contest at issue qualified as gambling . . .” (citation omitted)).
133. See Dew Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 4 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017) (showing Dew-Becker “brought a statutory cause of action pursuant to section 28–8 of the Criminal Code (Code) [Loss Recovery Act] (West 2014))” alleging “act of wagering was an act of gambling as defined in section 28–1 of the Code.
See 720 ILCS 5/28–1 (West 2014))”); see also Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 90 (“The
question next becomes whether the [Loss Recovery] Act allows plaintiff to recover
the gambling loss he incurred as a result of a DFS contest facilitated by a thirdparty website, such as FanDuel.”).
134. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 92 (documenting legislative expansion of
legalized gambling in Illinois since 2012). See generally John I. Sharp, The Political
Geography of Gambling in the Midwest, 37 MIDDLE STATES GEOGRAPHER 62, 64 (2004)
(providing context for gambling attitudes while noting “declining economic condition in certain regions of the United States . . . along with changing moral standards in the United States, combined to make the moral arguments against
gambling much weaker . . . during the late 1980s and early 1990s in particular”).
135. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 90 (“We find that this language requires a
direct connection between the two persons involved in the wager.”).
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expressed that allowing every losing DFS contestant to press a claim
would open relief via the courts to “the thousands of Illinois residents who engage in DFS contests.”136 Therefore, the court held
that the statute did not apply.137
In its analysis, the court detailed the two prongs it explores
when evaluating a statute.138 Then, the court spent several pages
explaining that federal case law was not binding on the issue because the matter concerned “interpretation of an Illinois state statute.”139 The court also noted that the Illinois legislature was
working to catch its legislation up with changing times.140 Finally,
reasoning that allowing Dew-Becker’s recovery would “frustrate its
purpose,” the court held that the Loss Recovery Act should not be
applied.141
C. Masking a Botched Delivery
The Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the lower court’s reasoning.142 First, it noted that “Courts are not free to read into statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not
express.”143 Then, the court provided three bases for finding an
136. See id. at 91 (reasoning recovery “would frustrate the statute’s purpose
and yield absurd results”). In its review of the facts, the appellate court noted that
Dew-Becker argued, “If the legislature had intended to draft carve-outs, they could
have done so at any time, particularly given how recently the Criminal Code has
been amended.” See id. at 89 (providing overview of Dew-Becker’s arguments in
trial court). In 2016, the Illinois Gambling statute had more than ten specific
carve-outs. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1(b) (West 2016) (showing listing
of exemptions).
137. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 90 (quoting Goldfine v. Barack, 18 N.E.3d
884, 890 (Ill. 2014) (“This court’s primary objective in interpreting a statute is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.”).
138. See id. at 90 (quoting Goldfine v. Barack, 18 N.E.3d 884, 890 (Ill. 2014))
(“The most reliable indication of the legislature’s intent is the language of the
statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.”). “Further, it is well-settled that
when interpreting a statute, ‘we will avoid a construction that would defeat the
state’s purpose or yield absurd or unjust results.’ ” Id. (quoting Bowman v. Ottney,
48 N.E.3d 1080, 1085 (Ill. 2015)).
139. See id. at 91 (quoting Combs v. Ins. Co. of Ill., 497 N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986)) (“[D]ecisions by the [f]ederal courts, other than the United States
Supreme Court, as to the law of Illinois are not binding on state courts.”).
140. See id. at 92 (“It is, therefore, apparent that the trend in Illinois is toward
more relaxed gambling laws, not stricter ones. As such, we decline to interpret the
Illinois Loss Recovery Act in a manner that would frustrate its purpose and yield an
absurd result . . . .”).
141. See id. (noting recently decided Supreme Court decision paving way for
legalized sports gambling in states, including bills in play in Illinois).
142. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 21 (Ill. 2020) (rejecting reasoning but agreeing with holding).
143. See id. ¶ 14. (citing Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n,
30 N.E.3d 288, 294 (Ill. 2015)).
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error of interpretation.144 First, it stated that the difficulty of identifying DFS winners was not an impossibility.145 Second, it noted that
the concern for the efficiency of the courts was based on speculation.146 Finally, it noted that whether the law was becoming outdated was immaterial.147 Nonetheless, the court upheld the ruling
in favor of Wu.148
After evaluating the language of the statute, the court concluded the statute only required a gambling loss to have the basis
for a claim under the Loss Recovery Act.149 Noting that if a gambler’s use of a third-party facilitator to place the wager precluded
recovery, the court observed that there would be too many opportunities for the Illinois Loss Recovery Act’s effect to be avoided.150
“The law is not required to be blind to, or ineffectual against, the
ceaseless efforts and ingenuity of persons to circumvent the [Illinois
Loss Recovery Act].”151
In its analysis, the court referenced the three available tests for
determining whether the DFS wager was gambling: the predominant purpose test, the material element test, and the any chance
test.152 Of these, the material element test would have required the
court to consider whether the outcome of the wager depended “in
144. For further discussion of the reasoning, see infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
145. For further discussion of the reasoning, see infra notes 146–151 and accompanying text.
146. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 21 (“The appellate court’s conclusion that applying section 28-8(a) to DFS contests would open the floodgates of
litigation is speculative.”).
147. See id. at *¶ 20 (“It is not the role of the judiciary to declare the [Loss
Recovery Act] may not be enforced.”). This was a point emphasized by DewBecker’s counsel in the Plaintiff’s Brief. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at *11, DewBecker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (No. 1-17-1675)
(citing Lawrence v. Regent Realty Grp., 197 Ill. 754 N.E.2d 334, 339 (2001)) (“The
statute must be enforced as written, and a court may not depart from its plain
language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by
the legislature.”).
148. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 1 (“We hold that recovery is
unavailable.”).
149. See id. at *¶ 14 (citing Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n,
30 N.E.3d 288, 294 (Ill. 2015)) (“Courts are not free to read into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express.”).
150. See id. (noting point of Illinois Loss Recovery Act was to deter gambling
activity by creating mechanism for action to recover against winning party).
151. See Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 739
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (refuting attempt to narrow description on gambling devices based
on physical characteristics of games).
152. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶¶ 22–25 (Karmeier, J., dissenting)
(citing to Marc Edelman, Regulating Fantasy Sports: A Practical Guide to State Gambling Laws, and a Proposed Framework for Future State Legislation, 92 IND. L.J. 653,
663–65 (2017)) (explaining grounds for each test, objecting to majority reliance
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a material degree upon an element of chance, even if skill is otherwise dominant.”153 Claiming using the materiality test would yield a
result too subjective; instead, the court opted for the predominant
purpose test.154
The Dew-Becker court said choosing the predominant purpose
test aligned with the language and example used by the legislature.155 It then held that skill predominated the DFS contests and
that the contests could not be considered gambling.156 At this
point, the court introduced “several recent, peer-reviewed studies”
to buttress its holding.157 The court even went so far as to say that
the peer-reviewed studies should hold more weight than the Illinois
Attorney General opinion letter issued in 2015 finding such contests illegal gambling acts.158 However, the court added a comment: “We note that nothing in this opinion should be read as
on academic article to summarize three tests). For further discussion on the three
tests, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
153. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 23 (majority opinion) (explaining
subjectiveness of material element test).
154. See id. at *¶ 25 (claiming using predominant purpose test would provide
for more consistent rulings). “The predominate factor test, in contrast, provides a
workable rule that allows for greater consistency and reliability in determining
what constitutes a contest of skill.” Id.
155. See id. (noting use of similar language in other Illinois statutes while
carving out type of gambling device called “redemption machine” from gambling
statute due to element of skill required for winning play). “[O]ur legislature has
used the predominate factor test in other, similar contexts.” Id. (citing 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-2(a)(4)(A) (West 2020)). “The outcome of the game is
predominantly determined by the skill of the player.” See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/28-2(a)(4)(A) (West 2020)) (providing justification for redemption machine carve-out).
156. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 26 (reviewing studies to support
proposition industry experts consider DFS contests to be skill-based). A footnote
in the opinion noted that under the material element test the Appeals Court of
New York determined DFS contests were games of chance. See id. (citing White v.
Cuomo, 118 N.Y.S.3d 775, 780-81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)) (acknowledging “role of
skill in determining the outcome of DFS contests,” holding DFS “games of
chance”). White v. Cuomo centered around the legality of provisions in a parimutuel betting statute to regulate fantasy sports contests. See id. at 777 (describing
challenged legislation establishing contests would not constitute gambling due to
“consumer safeguards, minimum standards and the registration, regulation and
taxation of [interactive fantasy sports] providers.”).
157. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 26 (providing names of studies
from 2018-2019). The dissenting justice specifically called out this point. See id. at
*¶ 35 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (“From the outset, I must highlight the impropriety of the majority’s reliance on scientific studies – that are not found in the record
or in either party’s briefs – to make the factual determination that skill is the
predominate factor in a contest.”). For further discussion of the absurdity doctrine and how it allows courts to consider external material not presented for consideration, see supra note 44.
158. See Dew Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 27 (“Arguing for a different result,
plaintiff points to an Illinois Attorney General opinion letter . . . . However, that

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol29/iss1/5

24

Smith: Life Lesson: If You Place a Wager on April Fool's Day, You Cannot

2022]

LIFE LESSON

179

stating that regulation of DFS contests is unnecessary or
inappropriate.”159
Justice Karmeier dissented from the majority opinion.160 First,
he characterized the use of the predominant purpose test as a misconception of the court’s “quantitative” focus instead of a “qualitative” review.161 Second, he distinguished the difference between
the two approaches as setting aside the predominance of skill to
consider whether chance controls.162 He said the determination of
the character of DFS contests rested on the role chance played in
the outcome.163 Third, he posited that the factor of skill could only
dominate when skill could salvage the final results.164 Finally, in
support of his proposition that DFS contests were gambling events,
Judge Karmeier noted that the recently enacted Illinois Sports Wagering Act foreclosed loss recovery options specifically for DFS contests, seemingly implying recognition by the legislature that DFS
contests were acts of gambling.165
opinion did not have the benefit of the more recent research that has established
the predominance of skill in DFS contests.”)
159. Id. at *¶ 28 (Karmeier, J., dissenting); see also Christopher Gerlacher, An
Illinois Bettor Sued for the $100 He Lost on FanDuel, GAMING TODAY (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.gamingtoday.com/news/illinois-bettor-sued-100-lost-fanduel-unsuccessfully/ [https://perma.cc/G7HP-WUVL] (providing review of analysis while
agreeing with court’s reasoning).
160. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, *¶¶ 32-33 (Karmeier, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (“Due to its misconception of the predominate factor test, the
ingenuity exerted in head-to-head DFS contests duped the majority into believing
it is a game of skill when it truly is a game of chance. Therefore, I dissent.”).
161. See id. at *¶¶ 33, 43 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s quantitative approach lacks the foresight to distinguish an activity tactfully camouflaged as
a game of skill but whose outcome relies on a contingent event out of the participant’s control from an activity in which the participant can use his or her skill to
overcome any impact chance may have on the outcome.”).
162. See id. at *¶ 36 (citing Ruben v. Keuper, 127 A.2d 906, 909–10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1956) (explaining recent Supreme Court decisions understood
test to revolve around “whether the results predominantly depend on chance regardless if skill predominates in the process”). “Such analysis is considered a qualitative approach.” Id.
163. See id. at *¶ 43 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (describing role of skill in game
as critical to determination of its materiality). For further discussion of significance of qualitative vs. quantitative inquiry, see infra note 213 and accompanying
text.
164. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 46 (Karmeier, J., dissenting)
(describing how DFS nature makes it impossible for DFS player to change outcome once teams selected).
165. See id. at *¶ 47 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (reviewing for court-defined
elements of Sports Wagering Act as well as definition it gives to sports wagering).
Sports wagering was defined as
accepting wagers on sports events or portions of sports events, or on the
individual performance statistics of athletes in a sports event or combination of sports events, by any system or method of wagering, including, but
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OUR LIMITS”166

At the heart of gambling legislation lies the need to draw the
boundaries of permissible activity.167 The analysis of the DewBecker saga settled quickly into the statutory realm from the first
non-trial.168 In the context of the overall gambling landscape at the
time, it was not unreasonable that the judge looked for an out from
establishing precedent in this new area.169 However, from that
point forward, the Dew-Becker judges’ attempts to avoid creating law
in the absence of timely statutes effectively forced the Dew-Becker
courts into increasingly awkward analyses and holdings at each
phase of judicial review.170
In Dew-Becker III, by finding that DFS contests relied predominantly on skill, the justices could exempt DFS contests from the
Loss Recovery Act.171 However, the majority relied on studies that
were not introduced via either evidence or briefs.172 Nor did the
not limited to, in person or over the Internet through websites and on
mobile devices.
Id. (citing 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/25-10 (West 2019)).
A 2015 South Carolina loss recovery case also evaluated legislative intent when
loss recovery was at issue. See Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., 778 S.E.2d 888,
890 (S.C. 2015) (discussing legislature’s choice to allow loss recovery even when
plaintiff participated in illegal gambling). The case overturned an earlier case,
Johnson v. Collins Ent. Co., Inc., which was cited to by the court for its explanation of
loss recovery policy choices. See Johnson v. Collins Ent. Co., 564 S.E.2d 653, 666
(S.C. 2002) (considering whether state’s endorsement of video gaming precluded
cause of action), overruled by Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., 778 S.E.2d 888
(S.C. 2015).
166. See Carrie Arnold, Jesting Our Limits: Do April Fools’ Day Pranks Alienate or
Engage People?, SCI. AM. (Mar. 31, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/do-april-fools-jokes-tests-limits-alienate-engage/ [https://perma.cc/5A7E2E7K] (discussing using humor “to both test social bonds and bring groups
together”).
167. See Simmons, supra note 93, § 2 (providing definitions of games of
chance plus citations for other cases around nation concerning issue).
168. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 16138-U, at *¶ 7 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017) (showing question from judge focused on whether Dew-Becker met statutory basis for bringing claim under Loss Recovery Act). For further discussion of
this issue, see supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.
169. For further discussion of the trial judge’s handling of Dew-Becker’s
claim, see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
170. For further discussion of the appellate court holding, see supra notes
131–141 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the state supreme
court’s holding, see supra notes 142–165 and accompanying text.
171. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 27 (Ill. 2020) (“Because the outcomes of head-to-head DFS contest are predominately skill based, we conclude
that plaintiff was not engaged in ‘gambling’ with defendant as required under [the
Loss Recovery Act].”).
172. See id. at *¶ 35 (citing People v. Givens, 934 N.E.2d 470, 478 (Ill. 2010))
(“The majority should not take the position of an advocate and defend against
plaintiff’s suit by hastily accepting the validity of studies that it searched for outside
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court evaluate the merits of the research studies it introduced.173
The fact that the court gave only limited consideration to the two
alternate tests, the material element test and the any chance test,
seemed to betray its intent to except DFS from the definition of
gambling at all costs.174 After providing definitions for the tests,
the court opted not to analyze the applicability of either of them.175
The approach used by the Illinois supreme court to review a
statutory question under active legislative debate contradicted the
social policy constraints regarding sports gambling questions placed
on courts by the United States Supreme Court in its May 2018 Murphy decision.176 There, the Court acknowledged an interest in regulating gambling.177 However, it noted that it would be improper for
the Court to act outside the scope of its authority to make a policy
choice.178 In Dew-Becker, the court expressly used its position to advance a prospective legislative goal when the plain reading of the
statute contradicted that outcome.179
This Note Section shows how each phase of the case ushered in
new legal-reasoning gyrations from the reviewing judges.180 First,
the record . . . .”). For further discussion of the basis for the majority’s determination that DFS contests were not gambling activity, see supra notes 152–158 and
accompanying text.
173. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 35 (“[T]he majority failed to engage in its own analysis of the studies’ validity or credibility.”).
174. See id. at *¶ 25 (“[T]he any chance test is essentially no test at all, as every
contest involves some degree of chance. The material element test depends too
greatly on a subjective determination of what constitutes ‘materiality.’ ”).
175. See id. (“We find . . . that the predominate factor test is the most
appropriate.”)
176. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485
(2018) (limiting role to “interpret the law Congress has enacted and decide
whether it is consistent with the Constitution”).
177. See id. at 1470 (“[P]roponents argued that it would protect young people
. . . and the law was needed to safeguard the integrity of sports.”).
178. See id. at 1484 (“The legalization of sports gambling requires an important policy choice, but the choice is not ours to make.”).
179. See Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., 778 S.E.2d 888, 890 (S.C. 2015)
(Toal, C.J. dissenting in part) (discussing South Carolina court’s overreach by saying, “We find our Legislature has enacted specific gambling loss statutes as the
exclusive remedy for a gambler seeking recovery of losses sustained by illegal gambling. Accordingly, we now overrule our decisions that have implicitly authorized
recovery beyond these statutes.”); see also id. at 894 (“Although our decisions have
effectuated the intent of the Legislature to permit recovery for illegal gambling
losses . . . this Court has expanded recovery beyond these statutes. We take this
opportunity to re-evaluate . . . .”). For further discussion of the plain reading discussion, see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
180. See Dew Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 10 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017) (choosing to limit review of trial court decision by finding failure to conduct
trial, thereby declining to address whether trial court judgment “was contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence . . . .”); see also Dew Becker II, 123 N.E.3d, 90-
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Subsection A shows the trial court made its determination based on
the language of the Loss Recovery Act.181 Subsection B then shows
how the appellate court plainly announced it was doing the legislature’s work due to the absence of updated statutes.182 Finally, Subsection C addresses how the Illinois supreme court stretched the
statute language to cover its exceptional reach.183
A. Due Process: No Laughing Matter
In his complaint, Dew-Becker outlined a prima facie case for
recovery under the Illinois Loss Recovery Act.184 The bystander’s
report from his first trial documented that in real-time, Dew-Becker
directed the judge’s attention to the lack of support for the ruling.185 However, even if the application was improperly reasoned,
at least the judge framed his ruling around how he understood the
language of the Loss Recovery Act.186
When the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court,
the judge issued the same ruling.187 The holding, however, showed
a shift in the judge’s analysis from his first review of the facts.188
Rather than finding that Dew-Becker sued the wrong defendant for
recovery as he had initially found, the judge reasoned and held that
there was not enough of a direct connection between Dew-Becker
91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (agreeing with lower court holding Loss Recovery Act “does
not allow recovery when the gambling is conducted through a third party website”
because court held intent of Act was “to apply to allow recovery when two people
who know one another (or at least are familiar with one another’s identity) engage
in illegal gambling” while acknowledging parties in this case knew each other);
Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 21 (Ill. 2020) (explaining disagreement with
appellate court’s reasoning but affirming its decision).
181. For further discussion of the trial court’s misapplication of facts to the
statute, see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
182. For further discussion of the appellate court’s bold proclamation, see
supra notes 136–48 and accompanying text.
183. For further discussion of how the Illinois supreme court was left to remedy the perception of judicial overreach, see supra notes 142–48 and accompanying text.
184. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 4 (showing DewBecker’s complaint outlined prima facie case for recovery under Illinois statute).
185. For further discussion of Dew-Becker’s expressed disbelief at the reasoning, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
186. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 4 (showing judge
understood central issue to be inapplicability of claim to Loss Recovery Act
statute).
187. For further discussion of the trial court’s decision on remand, see supra
note 125 and accompanying text.
188. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 4 (showing judge
realized FanDuel was not directly involved in wager).
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and Wu to satisfy the Loss Recovery Act framework.189 However,
the court is only supposed to evaluate legislative intent in the absence of an ability to discern the plain meaning of the language.190
The Loss Recovery Act language was plainly written to apply to gambling, and if the court concluded the contest was a gambling contest, Dew-Becker should have been awarded recovery under the
statute.191 In the end, the outcome of the first visit to the trial court
foreshadowed the explanation for the finding in favor of the
defendant.192
B. Appellate Review Sets the Mark
At the appellate court level, the court’s decision to bar recovery outside of supporting law became even more egregious.193 The
court held that the contest was gambling activity, thereby opening
the door to recovery, but affirmed the lower court’s holding.194 To
arrive at that conclusion, the court collapsed two sequential prongs
of statutory analysis into one.195 Rather than beginning with the
189. See id. (reasoning third-party platform presented insurmountable problem to applicability of Loss Recovery Act).
190. See Dove, supra note 44, at 747-48 (outlining three approaches to discerning statutory plain meaning: “ordinary meaning,” which considers current context,
“intentionalism”, which examines legislator intent at time of enactment, “purposivism,” which considers policy goals). For further discussion of restraints regarding
statutory review, see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
191. For further discussion of language in Loss Recovery Act, see supra note
28 and accompanying text.
192. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (“The trial court
determined that this section of the [Loss Recovery] Act does not allow for recovery
when the gambling is conducted through a third-party.”). Contra Dew-Becker III,
2017 IL App. (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 7 (indicating recovery could have been sought
from FanDuel).
193. For further discussion of how the appellate court acknowledged the Loss
Recovery Act language did not exclude Dew-Becker’s claim when rooting its denial
in current legislative interests, see supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
194. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 90–91 (noting its agreement with trial
court statute was not meant to apply because “gambling at issue was not conducted
directly between one person and another person” even though parties knew each
other’s identities). The relevant language of the statute reads any “person who by
gambling shall lose to any other person . . . .” See id. at 89. The defense hinged its
argument upon the fact “that although the plaintiff sued him directly in this case”
the presence of a third party-facilitator precluded application of the Loss Recovery
Act. See id. (“Defendant testified that the contest at issue was ‘not an illegal gambling situation’ and that the Act was not meant to apply.”). In this way, DFS play is
fundamentally different from video game betting, which is a named exclusion
from the Act. See id. (highlighting video game gambling exclusion from Illinois
Loss Recovery Act). For further discussion of the trial court’s holding, see supra
notes 121–130 and accompanying text.
195. For further discussion of court’s analysis, see supra notes 138–141 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of the prongs of statutory analysis the
court used, see supra note 138 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

29

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5

184

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 155

first prong, plain meaning, and ending there because the plain
meaning was evident, the court instead considered the second
prong in tandem.196
As the court observed, allowing recovery would create potentiality for a remarkable increase in claims given DFS’s soaring popularity.197 Additionally, permitting recovery for plaintiffs like DewBecker could introduce inequity since not every DFS player would
know or have the ability to determine the identity of the opposite
gambler.198 Nonetheless, the court exceeded its authority.199 Furthermore, when the appellate court partly justified its decision on a
lack of court cases, it ignored the cases it cited just pages earlier
that referenced cases arising from within Illinois.200 Hedging its
bets, the court emphasized the state did not need to follow federal
decisions.201 Ironically, the court used federal case law to justify its
opinion.202
C. Punchline
The Supreme Court of Illinois highlighted that some gamblers
on DFS platforms do not know their opponents’ identities, so precluding recovery by those who know that information would be illogical.203 In fact, the state supreme court went as far as to address
196. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 91 ((showing court considered plain
meaning and current legislative intent together instead of sequentially).
197. For further discussion of growing popularity of DFS, see supra notes 8–11
and accompanying text.
198. For further discussion of the logistics of DFS wagers, see supra notes
45–50 and accompanying text.
199. For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s guidance regarding statutory review in relevant gambling-statute case Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
see supra note 176 and accompanying text. For further discussion of how another
state supreme court overturned itself to correct its overreach, see supra note 179
and accompanying text.
200. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d 86, 87 n.1 (citing Sonnenberg v. Amaya Grp.
Holdings (IOM) Ltd., 810 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2016); Phillips v. Double Down
Interactive LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 737 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Langone v. Kaiser, No.
12 C 2073, 2013 WL 5567587, ¶ 3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013)) (chronicling cases involving statute 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-8 and giving it short title of “Illinois Loss
Recovery Act” for consistency with court terminology in those cases).
201. For further discussion of the question regarding contemporary Loss Recovery Act-based cases, see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
202. See Dew-Becker II, 123 N.E.3d at 91–92 (citing to Seventh Circuit opinion
regarding Illinois statutory changes).
203. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 16 (Ill. 2020) (“Moreover, nothing in the language of section 28-8(a) is per se inapplicable to DFS contests conducted on websites such as FanDuel.”).
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the absurdity in the appellate court reasoning.204 Furthermore, the
Illinois supreme court acknowledged that it needed to apply the
statute if it found it was constitutionally sound.205
However, the court then created its own absurdity by holding
that the DFS contest “was not gambling.”206 First, it selected the
test that would provide the most favorable analytical structure for
the desired answer to the gambling issue.207 It seems particularly
noteworthy that the court did not evaluate the Dew-Becker facts
through the analytical construct of the any chance test.208 After all,
the any chance test formed the basis of the recent opinion letter
from the state’s attorney general finding that DFS contests were acts
of illegal gambling.209 Then, rather than provide its own analysis of
the tests, the court relied on analysis supplied by academic scholars
who never appeared in court to subject the theories to
questioning.210
In an attempt to support its test selection, the court cited a
subsection of the Video Gaming Act and named a particular type of
excepted gambling activity.211 However, that gambling activity –
gambling at a redemption machine – relied on the gambling individual’s ability to throw an object at a target, not other players’ per204. See id. (“To be sure, the use of screen names may, in some instances,
make recovery more difficult for the loser of a DFS contest, but it does not make
recovery impossible.”).
205. For further discussion of limits on statutory interpretation, see supra
notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
206. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 21 (finding ambiguity in character
of daily fantasy sports play to incorporate outside scholarly materials.). See generally
Dove, supra note 44, at 758 (discussing doctrine of absurdity, noting “[w]hether a
judge intentionally or unconsciously seeks to disguise a results-oriented interpretation, the results of particular interpretations have the potential to impact interpretive decisions.”).
207. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 22 (providing three tests for evaluating element of chance necessary for gambling).
208. See id. at *¶ 25 (giving any chance test only one sentence in its evaluation
of which test it would use). For further discussion of qualitative approach’s significance, see supra notes 213 and accompanying text.
209. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 27 (noting any chance test underpinned Texas finding DFS contests were illegal gambling acts; any chance test also
supported analysis adopted by Attorney General of Illinois in 2015 opinion letter
on issue). The Edelman article cited by the court shows that some of the states
determining DFS play was gambling also relied on the any chance test. See Mark
Edelman, Regulating Fantasy Sports, 92 IND. L.J. 653, 664 n.53 (2017) (identifying
“Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, and Tennessee” as examples).
210. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 26 (naming studies used to
demonstrate outcomes of random DFS team assignments versus selected teams).
211. For further discussion of skill-based play, see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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formances on a given day.212 Furthermore, the justices selected a
test for their analysis that seemed at odds with its analytical approach, as noted by the dissenting judge.213 In its closing, however,
the court left the legislature room to narrow the entryway for sports
gambling by limiting its ruling to head-to-head DFS contests.214
Nonetheless, while making a show of knowing and respecting its
bounds, the court seemed to ignore the plain text of recently enacted legislation, a real-time indicator of legislative intent.215
VI. IMPACT: META HUMOR
As the Illinois courts narrowed their reasoning for disallowing
recovery under the Loss Recovery Act, its supreme court ultimately
held that DFS contests did not constitute gambling.216 This holding was a marked change in Illinois and a marked change to common practice among the states generally.217 Notably, the definitive
ruling made Illinois more attractive to DFS operators because it reduced the business risks to the operators.218 Meanwhile, the definitive ruling left future courts and impacted individuals little recourse
for recovery.219
The court’s ruling also served as an invitation to current and
future state legislators to leave the hard work of crafting the particu212. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶ 25 (providing detail of gambling
device).
213. See id. at *¶ 36 (explaining predominant factor test involves qualitative
approach). For further discussion of how the studies entered the case, see supra
note 172 and accompanying text.
214. See Carter Floyd, DFS Decision in IL Could End Mobile Sports Betting Waiting
Period, L E G A L S P O R T S B E T T I N G (Apr 27, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://
www.legalsportsbetting.com/news/dfs-decision-in-il-could-end-mobile-sports-betting-waiting-period/ [https://perma.cc/EY7Y-BFPS] (“[I]t only specifies ‘head-tohead’ DFS contests as being games of skill, meaning that other types of contest
might not be covered.”).
215. For further discussion of the Sports Wagering Act, which addresses DFS
contests, see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
216. For further discussion of the court’s reasoning, see supra notes 142–165
and accompanying text.
217. See Jeffrey Standen, The Special Exemption for Fantasy Sports, 42 N. KY. L.
REV. 427, 428, 435 (2015) (discussing status of states’ sports gambling laws in 2015,
while noting fantasy sports as federal carve-out).
218. See Danny Lawhon, Illinois Ruling Huge for Daily Fantasy Sports, GAMING
TODAY (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.gamingtoday.com/news/illinois-ruling-hugefor-daily-fantasy-sports/ [https://perma.cc/KR96-ML9J] (mentioning Madigan
opinion’s chilling effect on DFS operators, speculating ruling will increase investor
confidence).
219. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶ 11 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017) (explaining why case was statutory in nature rather than based in tort or
contract law).
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lars of legislation to the courts.220 In the absence of support from
within the statute’s plain language, the case briefs, or legislative
materials, the court introduced evidence that it thought suited the
legislature’s purpose and thereby invited other future courts to do
the same.221 Additionally, the South Carolina case Proctor v.
Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc.222 shows that at least some justices could be
eager to use Dew-Becker to support using statutory interpretation
cases to ameliorate newly identified gaps in legislation.223 As highlighted in Dew-Becker, statutory claims cannot be resolved by conference.224 The ruling will also have repercussions on companies
inside and outside of Illinois, communities, and individual DFS
players.225
The challenge faced by the Dew-Becker court of trying to prevent absurd outcomes springing from legislative gaps was neither
novel nor unforeseeable.226 At this point, the move to online recreation was well underway.227 Preventing absurdities from gambling
220. See Dew-Becker I, 2020 IL 124472, at *¶¶ 17–19 (Ill. 2020) (providing
rationale for characterizing gambling as non-gambling while subsequently quoting
language of Criminal Code stating clearly “person commits gambling if he or she
‘knowingly plays a game of chance or skill for money or other thing of value,’
unless excepted”).
221. See id. at *¶ 44 (citing People v. Mitchell, 444 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Ill.
1983)) (“The majority opinion risks legalizing traditional concepts of gambling
anytime a study concludes that it involves skill more than chance. One example is
poker. Our courts, like many other courts, have determined poker and other card
games to be games of chance despite statistical evidence that skill dominates.”).
222. Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., 778 S.E.2d 888 (S.C. 2015).
223. See id. at 897 (“First, the General Assembly has not responded to Johnson
and Gentry to indicate its intention that sections 32–1–10 and 32–1–20 of the South
Carolina Code provide the exclusive remedy for losses sustained by illegal
gambling.”).
224. See Dew-Becker III, 2017 IL App (1st) 161383-U, at *¶¶ 11–14 (noting
while civil claims can be resolved via informal hearings, statutory claims require
trial).
225. For further discussion of how the ruling will impact federal tax collection, for example, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Pearce v. Foote, 113 Ill. 228, 240 (1885) (evaluating statutory
language, trade details to determine whether options that were brokered could
escape gambling consequences under statutory language, ultimately holding, “no
subtle finesse of construction ought to be adopted to defeat the end it is to be
hoped may be ultimately accomplished”). For further discussion of bending statutory language to match desired outcome, see supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
227. See Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 733 n.1
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (showing trend of online gaming by reporting one company’s participation rate of players originating from Illinois internet addresses at nearly
20,000 citizens). In Phillips, the plaintiff tried to bring a class action lawsuit against
an online casino-styled game that did not provide cash winnings. See id. at 736
(“Phillips filed a class-action complaint against Double Down in the Circuit Court

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

33

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5

188

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 155

laws was not even a challenge that was particular to Illinois.228 Even
though the Illinois state statutes were not keeping pace with shifting attitudes toward gambling, it seems difficult to justify denying a
Loss Recovery Act claim by promulgating that DFS outcomes are
determined primarily by skill.229
Finally, the holding illustrated a concern raised by the Supreme Court in its Murphy opinion.230 There, the Court noted the
importance of state legislatures taking responsibility for lawmaking
and the resulting accountability provided by elections.231 In the
end, the Dew-Becker case provides an example of the need for current, timely legislation to prevent the courts from trying to fill a
void outside their role.232
Katherine Smith*
of Cook County, Illinois, alleging that Double Down operates unlawful gambling
device.”).
228. For further discussion of how the issue permeated the United States, see
supra note 5 and accompanying text. For further discussion of states’ difficulties
with balancing society’s changing gaming behaviors and legislative intent, see supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
229. For further discussion of how the Internal Revenue Service methodically
evaluates whether DFS contests constitute gambling activity, see supra note 108 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of Dew-Becker’s motivation for bringing the lawsuit, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
230. For further discussion of the limits on the role of the judiciary, see supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
231. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477
(2018) (discussing how “anti-commandeering rule promotes political
accountability”).
232. See generally Dove, supra note 44 at 760 n. 94 (citing Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (discussing
Supreme Court precedent regarding statutory interpretation, limiting bringing in
other sources to instances of actual ambiguity). “Whatever might be found . . .
cannot be permitted to impact the interpretation of clear text.” Id.
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